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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Gaylon Eugene Lords appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his felony
DUI charge without prejudice.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Lords with felony DUI under a per se theory. (R., pp. 43-44,
104-07, 108, 112-13.)

Six days before the scheduled trial, the state requested a

continuance. (R., pp. 92, 121.) The basis for the continuance was that the prosecution had
concluded it needed “to provide expert witness disclosure regarding the breath test in this
case.” (Id.) The state noted that this was the first continuance it had sought, and the defense
had previously obtained two continuances of the trial. (Id.) The prosecutor stated that he
was seeking a continuance because while preparing for trial he “noticed that there might
be some issues with the standard operating procedures in this case” that might be “curable
through … testimony.” (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 15-21.) Because of the need for such expert
testimony to lay foundation for admission of the BAC test results, the state sought a
continuance to “properly disclose this expert and allow that testimony at trial.” (Tr., p. 24,
Ls. 22-24.)
Lords objected to the requested continuance. (Tr., p. 25, L. 17 – p. 29, L. 20.) The
district court denied the continuance, concluding that the state had failed to show good
cause for a continuance. (Tr., p. 31, L. 23 – p. 34, L. 9.)
Two days later, the state moved to dismiss without prejudice. (R., p. 125.) The
grounds for requesting dismissal without prejudice were that “the State, for the trial on
Monday, will be unable to present admissible evidence to reach its burden at this point in
1

time.” (Tr., p. 35, Ls. 21-25.) The prosecutor represented that he had been negligent
because of “an issue that [he] should have caught that [he] did not,” that he was not acting
in bad faith, but was “asking to dismiss for us to reevaluate the case to ensure that if we do
refile in the future that the case is solid and that we can meet our burden.” (Tr., p. 38, Ls.
15-22.)
Lords objected to any dismissal, requesting the court to “hold the state to the trial
it wanted,” or that any dismissal be with prejudice. (R., pp. 148-53.) Lords submitted an
affidavit stating that while on pre-trial release he had to provide urine samples; that he
could not drive and felt isolated; that he had put off surgery on polyps until after the trial;
and that while the matter was pending he had “no life.” (R., pp. 131-32.) Lords’ counsel
submitted an affidavit stating that in October he noticed BAC testing “did not comply with
the Idaho Administrative Code” and that the state had not disclosed an expert to lay
foundation for the BAC evidence, so he had focused trial preparation on “the impairment
theory.” (R., pp. 133-34.) He also stated that the two continuances he had requested were
to obtain “information and materials relevant to a defense to the impairment theory,” that
the Defendant had been under stress as a result of the charge, that counsel would be
prepared to proceed to trial on an impairment theory, and that if the state had earlier
disclosed an expert the defense would also have obtained an expert. (Id.)
The district court dismissed the charge without prejudice. (R., pp. 166, 172-73.)
The district court found that the dismissal was because the state was unprepared for the
trial and that “the state’s failure to be prepared is not the result of bad faith and was not
deliberate or intentional but is the result of inexperience and/or inadvertence.” (R., pp,
172-73.) Lords filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 176-79.)
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ISSUE
Lords states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it dismissed Mr.
Lords’ case without prejudice?

II.

Did the dismissal of Mr. Lords’ case without prejudice violate his
due process rights?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (emphasis original).)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Lords failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
without prejudice where the prosecution was unprepared for trial because it failed to spot
a foundational problem with its evidence, but the dismissal was not sought in bad faith?
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ARGUMENT
Lords Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Dismissing
Without Prejudice Where The Prosecution Was Unprepared For Trial Because It Failed
To Spot A Foundational Problem With Its Evidence, But The Dismissal Was Not Sought
In Bad Faith
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed without prejudice after finding that the prosecution was

unprepared to proceed to trial; that the failure to be prepared for trial was not deliberate or
intentional but the product of inexperience or inadvertence; and that the dismissal was not
sought in bad faith. (R., p. 172; Tr., p. 49, L. 17 – p. 50, L. 1.) Lords contends on appeal
that the district court erred by dismissing without prejudice because the motion to dismiss
was made to “gain a tactical advantage” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6) and violated his due
process rights because the motion was made to “gain a tactical advantage” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 12). Lords has failed to show error because he does not challenge, much less show
clear error in, the district court’s findings that the dismissal was sought because the
prosecution was unprepared for trial because of inexperience or inadvertence and not
because of bad faith.

B.

Standard Of Review
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss an information is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. I.C.R. 48; State v. Dixon, 140 Idaho 301, 304-05, 92 P.3d 551, 55455 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327, 329-30, 1 P.3d 828, 830-31 (Ct. App.
2000). The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues such as a
claimed due process violation is one of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly
erroneous, but free review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in
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light of the facts found. State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 841, 118 P.3d 160, 173 (Ct. App.
2005); State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v.
Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

C.

Lords Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That The
Prosecution Did Not Act In Bad Faith
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that dismissal and re-filing of charges can

violate due process if “done for the purpose of harassment or delay or forum-shopping
….” Stockwell v. State, 98 Idaho 797, 806, 573 P.2d 116, 125 (1977). ”Stockwell requires
the existence of bad faith to prove a per se due process violation.” State v. Bacon, 117
Idaho 679, 684, 791 P.2d 429, 434 (1990). Accord State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885,
136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). ”Before a due process violation can be found, the
defendant must show that the preaccusation delay caused substantial prejudice to the
defendant’s right to a fair trial and that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an
advantage over the accused.” State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842, 118 P.3d 160, 174 (Ct.
App. 2005).
Thus, to establish a due process violation in the dismissal and re-filing of charges,
the defendant must show that the state’s actions “caused substantial prejudice to the
defendant’s right to a fair trial and that the delay was a deliberate device to gain an
advantage over the accused.” Id. at 842, 118 P.3d at 174 (citing State v. Kruse, 100 Idaho
877, 879, 606 P.2d 981, 983 (1980); State v. Burchard, 123 Idaho 382, 386, 848 P.2d 440,
444 (Ct. App. 1993)). See
- -also
- - -United
- - - -States
- - - -v.
- -Marion,
- - - - 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971) (defining
bad faith, in the context of delay, to mean that the government sought delay “to gain tactical
advantage over the accused”). “To warrant dismissal rather than a new trial on due process
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grounds, government conduct must be so grossly shocking and outrageous as to violate the
universal sense of justice.” State v. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 45, 966 P.2d 33, 45 (Ct. App.
1998).
Due process is not violated by “delay that was caused by conduct that was in good
faith, but that was caused by inadequate, ineffective, or insufficient personnel or
management.” Davis, 141 Idaho at 843, 118 P.3d at 175. Due process protects against
“decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property” and “is
not implicated by an official’s lack of due care that causes unintended injury.” Id.
The district court found that the basis for the motion to dismiss was that the
prosecution was unprepared to proceed to trial due to inexperience or inadvertence, that
the lack of preparation was not deliberate or intentional, and that the dismissal was not
sought in bad faith. (R., p. 172; Tr., p. 49, L. 17 – p. 50, L. 1.) Because there was no bad
faith and no deliberate effort to prejudice the defense the district court’s findings support
its exercise of discretion.
Lords argues that the district court abused its discretion because the dismissal
allowed the state to “circumvent” the denial of a continuance and obtain a “tactical
advantage.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 11, 15.) This argument lacks merit because it is
contrary to the district court’s unchallenged factual findings and the applicable legal
standards.
“[A]n adequate foundation for the breath test results can be established either by
showing the test was administered in conformity with applicable test procedures or through
expert testimony.” State v. Svelmoe, 160 Idaho 327, 334, 372 P.3d 382, 389 (2016). The
record shows that the prosecutor failed to ascertain, until shortly before trial and too late to
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disclose an expert and have him or her testify, that testing of the calibration of the breath
testing machine had not been performed within the requisite time, and thus foundation for
the test results would require expert testimony. (Tr., p. 24, Ls. 15-21; p. 30, Ls. 1-25; p.
35, L. 21 – p. 36, L. 1; p. 38, Ls. 15-22. ) The record supports the district court’s factual
finding that the delay caused by dismissal and re-filing was not the result of bad faith or an
effort to prejudice the defendant, but rather because of a negligent mistake that prevented
the prosecution from being ready to proceed to trial on the scheduled date.
Nothing in the record suggests the state was attempting to interfere with Lords’
ability to have a fair trial. Certainly Lords would have preferred proceeding to trial with
the state unable to get its BAC evidence admitted, but he did not have a right to such a trial.
Rather, the district court acted within its discretion when it concluded that the dismissal
was based on inadvertence or inexperience and was not sought in bad faith as a way of
denying Lords a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the dismissal without prejudice.
DATED this 8th day of April, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 8th day of April, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
means of iCourt File and Serve:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
KKJ/dd
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